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Abstract 
 
This article uses an institutional network governance approach to explore the 
overlapping dimension of the policy fields between security, development, and 
human rights, reflected in the US and German provincial reconstruction teams 
(PRTs) in Afghanistan. The past two decades have witnessed a gradually changing 
paradigm in academic and policy debates regarding the questions of the normative 
basis of world order and possibilities for tackling imminent threats to security and 
peace (i.e. intra-state armed conflicts, failed states, terrorism, poverty, and 
deepening inequality). The introduction of concepts such as “human security” and 
“the right to humanitarian intervention/responsibility to protect (R2P)” as well as 
critical examinations of peace-, nation-, and state-building missions (PNSB) have 
led to a relativist tendency of state sovereignty and a changing attitude regarding 
how to address the intersection of security, development, and human rights. 
Despite this shift, the policy commitments to integrating these policy 
considerations remain puzzling. How have they been redefined, conceptualized, 
and put into practice? I argue that an integrated conceptual approach has 
facilitated the redefinition of common policy goals, principles, and the mobilization 
of resources. At the same time, civil and military cooperation, as demonstrated in 
the multifunctional work of PRTs, has been Janus-headed—permanently caught 
in an ongoing tension between the war on terror and short-term stability operation 
on the one hand and long-term durable peace and development on the other. The 
misunderstanding of its interim character, the dynamics of Afghan environment, 
the blurring of policy lines, and the differences between national PRT models have 
made it difficult to systematically assess the efficiency and legitimacy of each 
policy frame and program.  
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Introduction 
 
 The past two decades have witnessed a gradually changing paradigm in academic and 
policy debates regarding the questions of the normative basis of world order and possibilities 
for tackling imminent threats to security and peace (i.e. intra-state armed conflicts, failed states, 
terrorism, poverty, and deepening inequality) at different levels. The introduction of concepts 
such as “human security” and “the right to humanitarian intervention/responsibility to protect 
(R2P)” as well as critical examinations of peace-, nation-, and state-building missions (PNSB) 
have led to a relativist tendency of state sovereignty and a changing attitude to address the 
intersection of security, development, and human rights (UNDP, 1994; Brahimi Report, 2000; 
the UN Millennium Declaration, 2000; the World Summit Declaration, 2005; UN core 
documents, 2004 and 2005). Actors involved are increasingly aware that these three policy 
fields are interdependent and that they should form an integral part of any comprehensive 
conflict resolution and sustainable development strategy.  
To date, three cross-cutting debates in security studies; International Relations (IR) 
research; development, and human rights research; and policy-field analyses have begun to 
consider this intersection. First, the changing nature and scope of PNSB from a top-down 
approach to mutual commitment has upheld the importance of local ownership and questioned 
the assumption of the Western liberal democratic model of states in relation to international 
stability (Barnett, 2006; Johnston/Slyomovic, 2008; Valença, 2011). State- and nation-building 
historically constitute the efforts of (imperial) external actors to build effective and legitimate 
domestic institutions in young nation states in order to assure the great powers’ spheres of 
influence there (Rubin, 2005: 94-95). State-building focuses on the establishment of political 
institutions and the creation of favorable economic circumstances. With the emergence of 
failed states, civil armed conflicts, and terrorism as top international concerns, (post-conflict) 
nation-building in the post-Cold War era has become more comprehensive and complex. It 
includes efforts to establish democratic institutions, institute security sectors reforms (SSR), 
facilitate economic and societal reconstruction, and encourage reparation and reconciliation. 
Without question, the interplay of security, development, human rights, justice, and peace 
issues has gained weight in international commitments.
2 In particular, in view of the limitations 
of and lessons learned from the past UN peace missions, the introduction and 
institutionalization of post-conflict peacebuilding (i.e. the establishment of the UN 
peacebuilding commission in 2005) has underlined the necessity of developing a more 
comprehensive approach in pursuit of different policy objectives. Post-conflict peace-building 
(PCPB) involves a multi-dimensional peace endeavour (ranging from state and nation-building, 
economic reconstruction, and development to socio-cultural and historical reparation and 
reconciliation etc.), where both the top-down and bottom-up approaches are needed for 
constructive and inclusive commitments between international and local actors.
3 Even though 
practitioners, regional and international organizations, and states might have conceptualized 
and operationalized their mandates differently (Barnett et al., 2007), the success of such 
peacebuilding work still hinges on whether or not a given approach has delivered a positive 
impact upon people’s lives (Street et al,. 2008). The tensions and dilemmas of PNSB have 
engendered a reflection and learning process, leading to the questioning of the appropriateness 
of external intervention. Academic conjecture has called for the adoptionon of a different 
perspective (Slim, 1995; Leaning/Arie, 2000; McRae, 2001; Khagram/Clark/Raad, 2003; 
Nelson/Dorsey, 2003; Ramcharan, 2004; Krause/Jütersonke, 2005; Grimm, 2005; Duffield, 
2006; Paris/Sisk, 2009; Dayton/Kriesberg, 2009). Such a different perspective would, for 
example, incorporate another dimension of peace, namely, social justice by creating a social 
environment where egalitarian conditions exist and human rights and human dignity are International Security, Development, and Human Rights: Policy Conversion or Conflict? 
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respected, regardless of the existence of the Western state model and values 
(Johnston/Slyomovic, 2008; Valença, 2011: 644).  
Second, the introduction of “human security” (HS) as a concept and agenda in foreign 
policy and international politics has prompted controversial debates and challenged the state-
centric understanding of how to preserve security (with such efforts being termed “national 
security,” “cooperative security” and “comprehensive security”). However, the conventional 
notion of “national security” neglects the human element. In contrast, HS is about security of 
individuals and people. The 1994 UNDP report has explored the link between pervasive threats 
(such as poverty, terrorism, disease, and an unequal world order) and the lack of the human 
dimension of security. Specifically, the report identified seven realms of security that must be 
ensured and protected by any PNSB efforts: personal security, economic security, food 
security, health security, environmental security, political security, and community security 
(UNDP, 1994). The content of the report can be traced back to the ideas of human rights and a 
more humanitarian agenda. In spite of the critiques of its conceptual and analytical weaknesses, 
possible connections with masked ideologies, as well as the question of its applicability 
(Suhrke, 1999; Richmond, 2001; Paris, 2001; Stewart, 2004; de Larrinaga/Doucet, 2007; 
Chandler, 2008), such a human security paradigm or framework has gained relevance in the 
elaboration of policy options and scientific endeavors. For example, in recognizing the 
insufficiency of national security to protect people’s security, some middle powers (notably 
Canada, Norway, and Japan) have incorporated the idea of HS into their foreign policy 
agendas.
4 Similarly, inspired by the concept of HS, the European Union (EU) has endorsed a 
new combination of military and civilian tools for establishing its security capabilities (EU 
2003; Flechtner, 2006: l58; Kaldor/Glasius, 2004, 2005). Also, the potential of HS in 
uncovering the link between development, gender equality, specific regional experience of 
insecurity, and governance and developing further concepts and strategies for the delivery of 
sustainable development and peace cannot be underestimated.
5  
Third, against the backdrop of the polarized debates surrounding the concept of HS as an 
increasingly important element in international law, academics and practitioners have provided 
insights into the overlapping dimensions of these policy fields. While they note the limits of 
international human rights and development programs in addressing the question of gender 
inequality in developing countries (Nyamu, 2000), they acknowledge an emerging right of 
humanitarian assistance through military enforcement to restore democracy, to protect human 
rights and to promote human security (Fielding, 1994, 1995; Bruderlein, 2000). This new right 
has found full elaboration in the R2P doctrine as a basis for collective action to rescue 
populations in grave danger and, henceforth, as a part of a progressive foreign policy agenda 
(Banda, 2007). To be sure, the presentation of the doctrine “R2P” in establishing the 
foundations for a new normative and operational consensus on the role of military intervention 
has been a breakthrough in addressing the controversies of humanitarian intervention (HI).
6 
The very notion of R2P encapsulates the growing necessity for “non-intervention” for “national 
security” to yield to the principle of international responsibility (i.e. to protect foreign 
populations under threat of mass killings and ethnic cleansing if and when the governments of 
such populations are either complicit or ineffectual.
7 Meanwhile, despite the introduction of the 
guiding principles and rules for military enforcement relevant to different actors, critics find 
that the R2P doctrine remains embedded in a vision of international rescue coming from 
outside, often driven by the logic of classical realism without appropriately including the needs 
and interests of local actors (Hamilton, 2006; Stahn, 2007; Mégret, 2009).  
The debates mentioned above have demonstrated a meaningful change in international 
commitments to addressing the overlap between security, development, and human rights 
through the introduction of new norms and policy options. Still, uncertainties remain regarding 
the following question: How have the concepts and agendas of security, development, and Journal of International and Global Studies 
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human rights been redefined, conceptualized, and put into practice prompting consensus, 
conversion, or conflict within the policy networks involved? The existing literature has so far 
failed to provide satisfactory systematic answers to this question. This is the case for both IR 
research and for the policy fields’ research communities. 
Supported by an institutional network governance framework, this article analyzes a new 
policy approach (civil and military cooperation) and tries to find some first hints in addressing 
remaining questions.
8 Taking the US and German provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in 
Afghanistan as case studies, the study examines the overlapping complexity of policy fields 
between security, development, and human rights. It aims to explore the evolving character of 
interrelated conceptual frameworks in security, development, and human rights and the 
intersection thereof. Through the analysis of case studies, this paper also aims to understand 
how these frameworks have been put into practice (programming, strategies, options and 
consequences) and what the implications of doing so have been.  
My arguments are as follows: First, new issue networks have emerged and penetrated the 
existing policy paradigms following the perception of new threats, the redefinition of problem 
formulation, and the elaboration of new policy discourses. Second, an integrated conceptual 
approach between security, development, and human rights has facilitated the redefinition of 
policy goals, principles, the mobilization of resources, and implementation. Both 
consensus/conversion and conflict over policies have prompted the necessity of cultivating the 
capacity of agencies involved to go beyond the norms of each policy frame in the pursuit of 
positive results. At stake are issues of flexibility and adaptability in the evaluation of policy 
development. At the same time, civil and military cooperation, as demonstrated in the 
multifunctional work of PRTs, has been permanently caught in an ongoing tension between the 
war on terror and short-term stability operation on the one hand and long-term durable peace 
and development on the other. The misunderstanding of multi-agency PRT as interim stability 
operation paving the way for long-term reconstruction and development work, the blurring of 
policy boundaries with conflicting priorities of agendas, patchwork-like development projects 
and security initiatives accompanied by civilian causalities, inadequate use of resources, 
insufficient knowledge of local institutional settings, as well as the elusive role of local actors 
(notably political elites, the warlords, and the Taliban) are all responsible for such 
development. 
To elaborate these arguments, chapter two adopts an institutional network governance 
framework with a focus on the consensus and conflict dimensions of policy networks at 
institutional and interactions levels and the complex interplay between security, development, 
and human rights. Based on this institutional network governance framework, chapter three 
detects the emergence of the concepts of CIMIC and PRTs as an overlap issue and examines 
the US and German military missions in Afghanistan. Chapter four then assesses the interplay 
found in the practice of PRTs and implications of such interplay for policy networks.  
Exploring the Nexus between Security, Development and Human Rights – An 
Institutional Policy Network Governance Framework 
Contrary to the relatively clear division between high politics (within which security 
issues enjoy high priority) and low politics (within which development and human rights issues 
are regarded as secondary) in foreign policy arenas during the Cold War, the past two decades 
have seen the increasing importance of development and human rights issues in relation to 
national and global security issues. While a widening and deepening sense of “security” has 
begun to include a people-centered approach (making the nexus between development, 
security, and peace crucial in development thinking and practice) (Uvin, 2002), epistemic and 
NGOs communities have also elaborated new strategies to address the nexus of security, International Security, Development, and Human Rights: Policy Conversion or Conflict? 
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development, and human rights (Nelson/Dorsey, 2003; Painter, 2004). The relationship 
between pervasive human rights violations, the lack of access to education and resources, and 
the root causes of conflict and insecurity are clear.
9 How has this linkage between security, 
development, and human rights been approached? To what extent has this linkage prompted 
framework conflicts and a paradigm change of each policy area? 
    
Institutional Policy Networks Governance and Its Consensus/Conflict Dimensions 
 
The study of governance networks involves the discovery of non-hierarchical forms of 
governance based on negotiated interaction between a plurality of public, semi-public, and 
private actors (Sørensen/Torfing, 2007a: 3). It argues that policy, defined as a desired outcome, 
is a result of governing processes. These processes are no longer fully controlled by the 
government but are increasingly subject to a variety of actors whose interactions give rise to a 
relatively stable pattern of policy-making that constitutes a specific form of regulation or mode 
of pluricentric coordination (Mayntz, 1993). Correspondingly, the term “network” seems to 
have become a new paradigm of fragmentation, complexity, and new social dynamics 
(Sørensen/Torfing, 2007a: 5; Börzel, 1998) in which structures for communication and 
interaction between a variety of actors emerge and become stable. Besides formally 
institutionalized decision-makers, networks include many interconnected actors, each of which 
draw on particular resources to influence the way public and private policies are formulated 
and implemented (Marin/Mayntz, 1991). In this sense, a governance network involves a 
relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors. 
These actors interact through negotiations, which take place within a regulative, normative, 
cognitive, and imaginary framework. This framework is self-regulating within limits set by 
external agencies and contributes to the production of public purpose (Sørensen /Torfing, 
2007a: 9). In particular, as Sørensen/Torfing argue, governance networks as a distinctive 
mechanism of governance distinguish themselves from the hierarchical control of the state and 
the competitive regulation of the market, in which a reflexive rationality often dominates 
decision-making and the question of compliance through the generation of generalized trust 
and political obligation over time becomes sustained by self-constituted rules and norms 
(Sørensen/Torfing, 2007a: 11-12).  
At the same time, the role of the institutional setting and processualism as a part of the 
broader conditions for the functioning of governance networks cannot be ignored. For one 
thing, as argued by Maynard-Moody/Herbert, administrative policy making is a separate, 
distinguishable process, not a stage or component of legislative policy-making. The 
institutional setting has a major influence on policy ideas, choices, and actions. Administrative 
agencies form a distinct institutional setting for policy politics and setting influences for policy 
outcomes (Maynard-Moody/Herbert, 1989). The subservient role of administrative agencies in 
the terminology of implementation is therefore conceptually flawed. The institutionalization 
process is circular: Agencies and programs are created to implement specific policies. Once 
established, they develop their own norms, rules, and procedures that become difficult to 
change or redirect (Maynard-Moody/Herbert, 1989: 140). Furthermore, the idea of institutional 
processualism pertains to the capacity of institutions to elicit reasons for public policy that form 
the appropriate grounds for those policies (Barzelay/Gallego, 2006; Zeisberg, 2010). Such a 
processualism can serve as a praxis concept for the evaluation of the legitimacy of 
governmental processes; it can also open constitutional theory to empirical investigation 
regarding the extent to which institutions can and do foster the processualist ideal. Meanwhile, 
the institutional setting and processualism as praxis concepts may encounter their limits, where 
new policy options are created and a strong degree of adaptability and efficient coordination 
work among administrative agencies is highly desirable. In particular, as Sutton points out, a Journal of International and Global Studies 
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“linear model” of policy-making, characterized by objective analysis of options and separation 
of policy from implementation, is inadequate. Instead, policy-process and policy 
implementation are best understood as a “chaos of purposes and accidents.”
10  
The adoption of governance networks from an institutionalist perspective is supposed to 
examine whether and how consensus building and the development of their own logic of 
appropriateness to tackle complex, uncertain, and conflict-ridden policy problems and to 
reduce the risk of implementation resistance are on the right track (March/Olsen 1995: 27). At 
the same time, disturbances such as fluctuations in the composition of network actors, the 
presence of unresolved tensions and conflicts, weak and ineffective leadership, and frustration 
over the lack of clear results can reduce the possibilities of optimizing the functioning of 
governance networks on all dimensions (Klijn/Koppenjan, 2004; Scharpf, 1993). In addition, 
governance networks may increasingly be a challenge to governability, as they become 
autonomous and resist central guidance (Rhodes, 1996). 
In view of the existence of different opinions with regard to the essential characteristics 
of the policy network phenomenon, one may need to re-assesses the concepts of “issue 
networks,” “arenas” and “policy networks”, address problems across networks, and explore the 
implications of consensus and conflict in policy networks at institutional and interaction 
levels.
11 Due to the specific issues at stake, the characteristics of the wider policy area or the 
particular historical development of interaction processes, “policy networks” may be conceived 
and develop differently. Lowi uses the term “arenas” and argues that depending on the nature 
and intensity of conflict or the clash of interests between a set of actors, a specific 
configuration of actors or “arena” develops. Some arenas have a more pluralist (open) 
character; others tend toward a more elitist (exclusive) structure (Lowi, 1963). In case 
problems cut across networks, interaction is possibly hampered by the presence of a variety of 
frames, paradigms, or policy cores firmly anchored in the networks of which the various 
representatives are a part. In that case, fundamental policy controversies may develop in which 
parties question each other’s policy cores. Frame conflicts may also emerge when parties 
dispute whose frames are to be applied (Rein/Schön, 1986). Finally, a lack of joint values, 
shared language, and common rules may result in a “dialogue of the deaf,” which blocks the 
realization of joint solutions and the tackling of societal problems (Klijn/Koopenjan, 2004; 
Koopenjan, 2007:146). 
The overlapping dimension between policy networks may prompt the development of 
consensus-building, policy integration or conversion, or conflict in varying degrees. Koppenjan 
notes that while both consensus and conflict perform important positive functions in policy 
networks, too much or too little consensus or conflict may make governance networks 
dysfunctional (Koopenjan, 2007:150). At the institutional level, consensus is an expression of 
the degree to which actors within the network have learned to interact. Conversion, in which 
inter-agency coordination among different policy networks is deemed to be institutionalized 
and the question of policy coherence becomes crucial, may emerge on the one hand. On the 
other hand, excessive consensus leads to a systematic oppression of problems, interests; and 
parties; too little consensus means that an institutionalized practice hardly exists. At the process 
level, consensus is a necessary precondition for interaction in situations of interdependency. 
However, too much consensus at this level means a lack of participation, options, and variety; 
too little consensus may lead to the escalation of conflicts. 
At the institutional level, the presence of conflict indicates that the network is neither 
completely closed nor static, as the institutionalized values, norms, frames and rules are 
questioned. Excessive conflict means that a network may disintegrate; too little conflict leads to 
insufficient articulation of interests and inadequate allocation of resources and use of capacities 
within the network. At the interaction level, conflict may contribute to the articulation of 
formerly underrepresented interests, trigger the mobilization of new resources, information and International Security, Development, and Human Rights: Policy Conversion or Conflict? 
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research, and promote the transparency of processes. However, excessive conflict at this level 
may lead to the stagnation of problem-solving; too little conflict within interactions may lead to 
the exclusion of important insights, interests, and options. 
The implications of consensus and conflict within policy networks at both institutional 
and interaction levels are summarized in the table 2.1. It yields some important insights into 
good network governance. Instead of emphasizing consensus building and conflict regulation, 
efforts should be made to prevent and reverse overinvestment in consensus building and to 
pursue a healthy degree of conflict (Koppenjan, 2007: 149-50). 
 
Table 2.1: Consensus/Conversion and Conflict/Division at institutional and interaction levels within policy 
networks (a modified version based on Koppenjan 2007: 151) 
  
Changing Paradigms? The Interplay between “Security,” ”Development,” and ”Human 
Rights” from the Perspective of Network Governance 
 
Security issues networks are traditionally rooted in a neorealist understanding of 
security, which primarily focuses on the state as both the subject as well as the object of 
security policy (Waltz, 1979). The state is conceptualized as the only legitimate provider of 
security. Only the state possesses the capabilities which are necessary to ensure sovereignty, 
national security, and territorial integrity against competing states within an anarchic 
international system. Therefore, military security and material capabilities are emphasized. 
Similarly, the neoinstitutionalist understanding of security considers the state to be the main 
subject and object of security policy (Krasner, 1983). Moreover, the merits of international 
institutions in general and international regimes more specifically as the most promising means 
    Institutional level  Interaction level 
Consensus / 
Conversion 
Too much  Systematic exclusion of interests and 
parties; non-transparency; merging 
of policy paradigms, clear policy 
priorities and preferences 
Exclusion or ignorance of 
problem perceptions, 
information, alternatives and 
innovation 
  Functional  Offers certainty in uncertain setting; 
moderate conflict through enduring 
relations, adoption of cross-over 
policy perspectives 
Simplifies and facilitates policy 
formation and implementation, 
problem-solving; reduces 
transaction costs 
  Too little  No sustainable institutional 
arrangements or solutions 
lack of trust; interaction is not 
brought about or reaches 
deadlock 
Conflict / 
Division 
Too much  Hinders process; network 
disintegrates 
mistrust; competition for 
resources; high transaction costs; 
solutions are not brought about 
or are ineffective; with negative 
consequences for relations 
  Functional  Prevents closeness; does justice to 
pluriformity; promotes transparency, 
conflict management, fruitful policy 
evaluation 
has mobilizing and accelerating 
effects; contributes to infor-
mation provision, variety, 
quality and innovation 
  Too little  Insufficient articulation of interests; 
inadequate planning and allocation 
of resources and use of capacities  
Lack of commitment and 
variety; centralized or little 
mobilization of resources Journal of International and Global Studies 
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for ensuring the provision of security for a state (Keohane/Nye, 1977) can be considered on 
two levels. First, security regimes, i. e. “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectation converge” (Krasner, 1983: 1) in the security area 
might mitigate concrete conflicts among their participants and prevent violent conflict 
management. Secondly, international regimes in the policy fields of environment or human 
rights might serve as arenas in which states can practice non-violent mechanisms of conflict 
settlement. This practice might later on spill over into issue areas more directly related to 
security policy and thus contribute to the amelioration of conflicts through collective efforts.  
In addition to traditional military threats studies, a variety of broadening understandings 
of security emerge in critical security studies (Tickner, 1995; Ullmann, 1983; Buzan et al., 
1997; Wæver, 1997, 2000; Burgess, 2007). A broadened understanding of security considers 
non-military threats from outside and inside a state, such as environmental scarcity and 
degradation, spread of diseases, mass refugee movements, terrorism, or nuclear catastrophes. 
Ullman suggests a similar broadening of national security, without considering its deepening 
(Ullman, 1983: 133-135). The state is still in the center of such a broadening understanding of 
security, where terms such as economic security, environmental security, social security, or 
military security only indicate different forms (and not fundamentally different concepts) of 
security (Ullman, 1983: 152; Baldwin, 1997: 23). In comparison, the emergence of the concept 
of “human security” (HS) in the 1990s as a response to two changing dimensions of the 
international order —referred to as globalization and the end of the Cold War— entails both a 
deepened as well as broadened understanding of security. To date, these political and economic 
transformations have increased the risk of internal conflict and shifted the locus of “insecurity” 
from the nation state and its allies to the individual and the community. This shift has led to the 
recognition that to protect and promote human development in the future, donors will first have 
to address the issue of human security—the question of security in people’s daily lives 
(Leaning/Ari, 2000), which involves four distinctive features: a focus on the individual, a 
concern with values of personal safety and freedom, the consideration of indirect threats, and 
an emphasis on non-coercive means (Bajpai, 2000). 
In particular, coupled with the introduction of R2P, HS as a new security framework 
has fundamentally challenged the core frames of traditional security policy and offered new 
perspectives in connection with both development and human rights policies. The objective of 
human security is to safeguard the vital cores of all human lives from critical, pervasive threats 
in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment.
12 In other words, the security 
agenda from a broadening and deepening perspective is supposed not only to address those 
critical pervasive threats that cut into the core activities and functions of human lives in large 
scale but also pursue the goal of human fulfilment, with the focus on a limited core of 
individual activities and abilities (i.e. on a fundamental subset of human development and 
human rights). Lack of human security, for example, has adverse consequences on economic 
growth and poverty and thereby on development. Also, the lack of development, or imbalanced 
development that involves sharp horizontal inequalities, is an important cause of conflict with 
consequences of human rights violations (Stewart, 2004: 1). The widening and deepening 
understanding of security with two referent objects (state- and human-/people-centered) thus 
constitutes an evolving dialectic relation that offers a promising way to address the 
contemporary security agenda of state, trans-state, and intra-state security issues and the 
connections between them (Kerr, 2003). Furthermore, the HS framework enables a description 
of the realities of state failure and pervasive insecurity, therefore helping elaborate strategies in 
a state and taking into account agency, interests, and incentives on the part of various local, 
national, regional and international actors (Bøås, 2005). 
The identification and fight against critical and pervasive threats and the pursuit of 
human fulfillment (Alkire, 2003) illustrates the intersection of security, development, and International Security, Development, and Human Rights: Policy Conversion or Conflict? 
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human rights and provides new perspectives for each policy network. Figure 2.1 illustrates this 
overlap between security, development, and human rights. 
 
Figure 2.1: The linkage between security, development and human rights 
 
 
Area B demonstrates the convergence of the global development and security agendas. 
At the normative and conceptual levels, one may find that there are three types of connections 
between the two. First, there exist immediate impacts of security/insecurity on well-being and, 
consequently, on development achievements. The second type of connection involves the way 
in which insecurity affects (non-security) elements of development and economic growth (i. e. 
the ways in which it involves the instrumental role of security). Thirdly, one needs to explore 
the ways that development affects security, or the instrumental role of development (Stewart, 
2004). Based on this conceptual convergence, the interconnectedness between security and 
development at policy and implementation levels can no longer be ignored. Security policies 
may become one part of development policy because insofar as they enhance security, they will 
contribute to development. Policies towards development may become part of security policies 
because enhanced development increases security. Hence, these connections suggest a quite 
radical revision of both security and development policies and their multiple roles. Following 
this revision, security is considered an intrinsic aspect of development and vice versa. Also, the 
development costs of insecurity and the ways in which development (underdevelopment and 
inequalities) affects security have increasingly gained attention in the process of policy 
formulation, implementation, and evaluation (Stewart, 2004: 11ff).  
To date, both the security and development policy communities have begun to respond 
to this interplay between security and development. On the part of the foreign and security 
policy community, the European Union (EU) for example, proclaims security as a precondition 
for development in its European Security Strategy (ESS). It views the tackling of poverty as 
one of the main challenges for European security. It also adopts avenues opened up for the 
notion of security and pleads to make multilateralism work through the consideration of the 
concerns of developing countries (EU, 2003). Therefore, European policy-makers emphasize a 
two-way link between development and security to be an increasingly core tenet of EU foreign 
policy (Youngs, 2007).
13 On the part of the development enterprise, a typology with a new 
focus on food and health (in)security and several useful post-development approaches have 
been deliberated that put forward the notions of “ownership,” “help to self-help,” and “equal Journal of International and Global Studies 
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partnership.” These alternative views have undoubtedly challenged the dominance of the neo-
liberal development approach that emphasizes economic growth, privatization, and 
deregulation (Hopp/ Kloke-Lesch, 2004, 2005; IHRN, 2008). Efforts have also been made to 
understand the intersection of development, violence, and conflict resolution practice. This task 
involves the deliberation of a comprehensive policy mix for both short and long term that 
covers the methodologies (conflict vulnerability assessments; conflict impact assessments etc.), 
post-conflict agenda (reconciliation; security sector reform; demobilization, disarmament and 
reintegration etc.), and context (political economy of peacebuilding; role of corporations; 
relations with the military).
14  
Area C involves the intersection between human rights and security. A variety of 
studies have explored this controversial relationship at different levels (for example Vincent, 
1986; Forsythe, 2000). For one thing, the protection of human rights by military means will 
directly challenge a state’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity. The normative tension of 
international relations rooted in the UN Charter, namely, national sovereignty and the 
forbidden use of force versus human rights protection via military intervention, has found some 
release through the introduction of the R2P doctrine. Still, R2P hinges directly on the political 
will of a community of states to bring it into practice, particularly in terms of the availability 
and consumption of military resources (Bellamy, 2006: 145; Macfarlane et al., 2004). 
Secondly, there exists a strong interdependence between human rights violations and 
intractable conflicts at local, national, regional, and global levels: Abuse of human rights often 
leads to conflicts that threaten national and regional security, and conflict typically results in 
human rights violations. Thus, human rights and security issues in foreign policy have often 
been treated either as incompatible or assigned a narrow instrumental role to fulfil their 
political functions. Finally, the introduction of the R2P doctrine and the emphasis on military 
action has raised broader questions about the relationship between humanitarian action, 
development efforts, and military intervention in the post-intervention phase.
15 Meanwhile, the 
notion of HS seems to offer an alternative perspective, as the state is expected to elaborate 
concepts, strategies, and measures that will address critical and pervasive threats effectively 
and ensure both national security and human fulfillment. Finally, the HS framework can give 
new impulses for the conceptualization of international human rights, as it embodies the 
security concerns of societies and unravels insecurity issues where the most vulnerable can 
articulate their security and human rights in their own terms, without being excluded and 
alienated (Aballero-Anthony, 2004).  
Area D involves the intersection between human rights and development. To be sure, 
human rights as internationally recognized standards constitute a basis for the accountability of 
governments, corporations, and NGOs. Human rights have become not only a new source of 
influence for NGOs’ advocacy, but they have also challenged the market-dominated view of 
development that has prevailed since the 1980s. Development policy-makers and practitioners 
have recognized that international development agencies (IDAs), both multilateral and 
bilateral, must promote and protect international human rights when (in collaboration with the 
national and local governments) they engage in “development projects” that affect directly the 
basic needs and interests of local populations (Paul, 1988-89: 67). In this spirit, the UNDP’s 
2000 Human Development Report forcefully argues that development strategies must be 
anchored in human rights reasoning and must be influenced very early: in their conception and 
implementation. Ramcharan also underlines the change of UN work by mainstreaming human 
rights, which is critical for a successful development strategy (Ramcharan, 2004: 41-42). In 
particular, both human rights and development NGOs communities have adopted the following 
new approaches to address this intersection that have already had important implications for 
donor agencies and governments: a human rights-based approach (HRBA) to development, International Security, Development, and Human Rights: Policy Conversion or Conflict? 
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joint advocacy work, and expanded attention to economic and social rights among human 
rights groups (Nelson/Dorsey, 2003).
16  
Finally, Area A deals with the overlap of security, development, and human rights, 
which embodies new threats and insecurities (e.g. new forms of nationalism, ethnic conflicts 
and civil war, information technology, biological and chemical warfare, resource conflicts, 
pandemics, mass migrations, transnational terrorism, and environmental dangers). Many of the 
significant risks arising from human and natural interactions do not emerge at global or local 
levels, but at intermediate scales. Therefore, concepts like “sustainable security,” “sustainable 
development,” and “HRBA” have become crucial in the examination of both opportunities as 
well as threats to security in order to offer implications for possible agenda of action, including 
interconnected frameworks, coalitions for change, interlocking institutional arrangements and 
disaggregated goals and indicators (Khagram et al., 2003). As material sufficiency lies at the 
core of human security, problems of poverty and deepening inequality that manifest structural 
human rights abuses are central concerns in both the security and development policy agendas 
(Thomas, 2001). In particular, recognizing the usefulness of the HS framework as it extends the 
understanding of security beyond state borders, the UN has called for a more holistic approach, 
focusing on people and their protection and empowerment so that natural and man-made 
disasters, such as hunger, disease, and socio-economic inequality can be effectively tackled. 
Thus, a consensus gradually emerges in the international community regarding the 
responsibility of the state to care not only for the wellbeing of its citizens, but also for people 
that may be threatened wherever they may be (UN GA, 2007). 
In short, in view of the interconnectedness and interdependence between security, 
development and human rights, their interplay has been addressed not only in form of a critical 
conceptual assessment but also in policy design and implementation, both from a widening and 
deepening perspective in each policy field involved. It follows that the embracement of new 
concepts, discourses and approaches such as “the HS framework” (supported by the method of 
the assessment of pervasive threats and insecurity), “sustainable security,” “sustainable 
development,” and “a HRBA to development” has challenged existing core values and 
principles in each policy frame. The extent to which the formation and functioning of policy 
networks can healthily and effectively work for the pursuit of the proclaimed objectives has 
thus become crucial.  
This chapter has elaborated an institutional network governance framework that 
highlights both the dimensions of policy consensus/conversion or conflict and the interplay of 
security, development, and human rights. To what extent this framework can help explain the 
complexity of policy networks is to be tested in the following analysis of the work of 
CIMIC/PRTs.  
Policy Networks in Practice: The US and German Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs) in Afghanistan 
 
 Since the US-led invasion in the fall of 2001 that toppled the Taliban regime, 
Afghanistan (its government, economy, and infrastructure and society) has been reshaped in the 
midst of the global anti-terror war and state- und nation-building processes, supported by major 
military and political involvement of outside powers, including the US, the UN and NATO. 
Whereas the 2001 Bonn Agreement set up the blueprint of a new Afghanistan with democratic 
structure and institutions, the five-year Compact adopted in 2006 in London (in the context of 
its Interim National Development Strategy) marked a new phase of partnership between 
Afghanistan and the international community, directed toward long-term capacity building 
(Jalali, 2007: 39). In particular, the year 2011 witnessed a meaningful change in international 
commitments: a considerable reduction of the military components, the strengthening of Journal of International and Global Studies 
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capacity-building and training mission in the areas of governance and security
17 and the 
preparation for The Transformation Decade of 2015‐2024 after withdrawal of the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-troops on December 31, 2014 (Bundesregierung, 2010 and 
2011; International Afghanistan Conference, 2011).  
To date, governance in Afghanistan has involved not only in a polycentric networking 
system with several major communicative circles (Bothe/Fischer-Lescano, 2002), it is also 
characterized by a high degree of intensity and complexity of policy networks, as security, 
development, humanitarian, and human rights issues become increasingly intertwined in the 
nation-building and peacebuilding processes. How have international, national, and local actors 
addressed the interplay of security, development, and human rights? This section first identifies 
the actors involved and their focus of policy engagement. It then explores the emergence, 
purpose, and development of civil and military cooperation (CIMIC) in the form of provincial 
reconstruction teams (PRTs). Through the examination of US and German PRTs, some first 
hints of policy conversion or conflicts between security, development, and human rights will be 
demonstrated.  
Derived from a socio-cultural and -political agent-based model, the power structure in 
Afghanistan can be described as having two core elements: (1) patron-client and affiliations 
relationships and (2) accumulation and re-distribution of resources between elite and non-elite 
agents (Geller/Alam, 2010: 14-15). There are six communicative circles that include 
international and Afghan actors. They involve hierarchical and horizontal networking forms 
with diverse or/and conflicting motivations, policy foci, and interests. First, legitimized by UN 
Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 and by the self-defense in the sense of the Art. 51 
of the UN-Charter, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) pursues the goal to fight against Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban with the participation of military forces from Australia, Great Britain, 
France, Canada, and Germany under US-command. OEF’s policy focus is then the pursuit of 
national, regional, and military security. Second, regional actors and neighbors in the form a 
group of six plus two (Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, China and Turkmenistan, plus the 
USA and Russia) have played a significant role in the fight against transnational terrorism. 
Still, the role of Pakistan as a strategic partner remains controversial. On the one hand, some 
observe that Pakistan has changed its approach from a double-edged strategy to that of close 
cooperation with the US counterterrorism efforts (Ghosh, 2010). On the other hand, Pakistan 
continues to provide sanctuary support to the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network, the 
Hekmatyar group and Al Qaeda. Key Afghan policy-makers have asked for more clarity with 
regard to the question of who are friends and foes in the midst of the global anti-terror war 
(Spanta, 2010). The policy focus of regional actors then involves military and political security 
issues and the maintenance of spheres of influence (Pakistan in particular).  
Third, there exists the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), established by 
the UN General Assembly in December 1993 to seek the views of a broad spectrum of 
Afghanistan's political leadership on how the UN could assist the country to bring about 
national reconstruction. Its Special Representative for Afghanistan has a mandate to manage 
peacemaking activities involving the warring parties and others concerned, with a view to 
facilitating the establishment of a fully representative multi-ethnic and broad-based 
government. The UNSMA’s major concerns involve political stability and development issues. 
Fourth, there are warlords, the Taliban, the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan 
National Police (ANP), and the Afghan central government. Though Afghan warlords— 
without Taliban participation—signed the 2001 Bonn Agreement that settled the provisional 
arrangements for the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, many Afghan 
local leaders have held and still hold a skeptical and resistant attitude toward the Bonn 
Agreement, which designs a model of central democracy. A strong central democratic 
government would threaten their power spheres at the local level. Therefore, many such groups International Security, Development, and Human Rights: Policy Conversion or Conflict? 
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are ready to adopt militant methods (including the support of Islamic fundamentalists, 
terrorists, insurgents, and criminals) to defend their political, economic, and tribal interests.
18 It 
follows that the major concern of Afghan local and national leaders largely diverges. On the 
one hand, local warlords focus on the question of ethnic political representation and narrow 
tribal and economic concerns. Despite its limited coercive capacity, the Afghan central 
government has to fulfill its political role as mediator among divergent local interests and also 
as a reliable partner toward the international donors and actors. On the other hand, ANA and 
the ANP are trained to take over the task of the provision of national and political security.
19  
Fifth, based on resolution 1386 of December 2001, the Security Council (SC) followed 
up on its security assistance pledge and authorized the member states participating in the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to “take all necessary measures to fulfill its 
mandate.” The SC has clearly stated that the ISAF is under the US Central Command, so there 
is no interference to the successful completion of OEF (UN document S/2001/1217). Normally, 
OEF has focused on the ongoing search for Al Qaeda and fighting remnants of the Taliban in 
the southern and eastern areas, although reconstruction activities are also a key part of the 
military strategy. The ISAF has focused on consolidating security in Kabul and its environs. 
Since 2003, the ISAF under NATO command has embarked on a phased expansion, scheduled 
to cover the whole country by November 2006. In other words, ISAF’s policy focus prioritizes 
the provision of military security, which serves as a prerequisite for the carrying out of 
reconstruction and development projects.  
Finally, there are civil actors, both internationals and Afghans themselves. The UN and 
donor states, for example, have focused on supporting the political stabilization and building of 
new Afghan political institutions, reconstruction, and economic recovery. Bilateral aid for 
reconstruction and development has come from dozens of countries, with USAID being the 
largest contributor. International NGOs have also been involved in providing relief, 
rehabilitation, reconstruction, development, and peacebuilding assistance. For example, 
supported by international NGOs, an Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF) was established in 
December 2001 with the aim of integrating the Afghan civil society into peacebuilding and 
reconstruction processes (Goeschel/Schnabel, 2005: 10). Moreover, a surge of private security 
contractors (PSC) with foreign and local employees has marked the flourishing of the out-
sourcing strategy of the military to save money and time for the provision of security for its 
facilities. The security operations of these contractors are designed to protect traveling convoys 
and guard U.S. bases in troubled southern provinces such as those located in Helmand and 
Kandahar. At the same time, serious questions have arisen as to how these private forces are 
managed, when they can legally use deadly force, and what happens if they break the rules.
20   
 
The Emergence of the CIMIC and PRTs Concepts 
 
The idea of the CIMIC is itself a tactical doctrine, which NATO formulated in its 
Directive MC 411/1 in July 2001 and later substantialized in its Allied Joint Publication (AJP-
9) in June 2003. In it, CIMIC is defined as “the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of 
the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population 
and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and 
agencies” (AJP, 2003). The primary function of CIMIC is to support the military mission. 
Therefore, a networking relationship between military and civil actors shall be maintained for 
information, personnel and equipments exchanges so that successful military missions can be 
ensured. In other words, the implementation of the idea of CIMIC means that soldiers will take 
over humanitarian and development work in war-torn/conflict situations over a specific period, 
for which they are not trained. However, the logic standing behind this new concept is that as 
social and development activities will boost the acceptance of local populations toward the Journal of International and Global Studies 
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military and thus reduce the danger of attacks, the new role of soldiers is designed to fulfill 
their military assignment and to protect military forces (Burghardt/Pietz, 2006).  
The PRT concept was launched by the US in November 2002, as coalition commanders 
began to prepare the transition of OEF from its war fighting phases to its stabilization and 
reconstruction phases. The overall idea was to use small joint civil-military teams to expand the 
legitimacy of the central government to the regions and enhance security by supporting security 
sector reform and facilitating the reconstruction process. Important elements of the PRT 
concept include: (1) the integration of civil and military components for the generation of 
synergy effects in the stabilization and reconstruction processes (Schmuck, 2008: 117) and (2) 
the insurance of force protection through improved military security measures and through 
civil measures so that the presence of foreign personnel can be recognized by the local 
communities (Brandstetter, 2005; Hofman, 2008: 31). This multinational program has been 
characterized by an emphasis on flexibility, a proliferation of national models, and an ad hoc 
approach to security and development (Perito, 2005).  
The first three PRTs were deployed by the US between December 2002 and March 
2003, and the PRT Working Principles issued in February 2003 identified three areas of 
activity: security, reconstruction, and central government support (Perito, 2005; Hett, 2005). In 
addition, the principles also stated that the PRTs would engage in relief operations in certain 
circumstances. The US invited other countries to establish similar teams. By November 2009, a 
total of 26 PRTs had been established with the participation of 14 nations whose personnel 
came from 40 nations (VENRO, 2009). Twelve PRTs have been managed by the US-led 
Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) conducting OEF, and the remaining 14 
have been led by ISAF. Although the PRTs differ in size, composition, and operational style, a 
number of common features stand out: They are joint teams of civilian and military personnel 
consisting of 50-300 personnel. They are generally made up by military personnel (90-95 per 
cent of total), political advisors, and development experts. The level of civil-military 
integration varies, and each team has been tailored to ensure that they have the capabilities 
suited to mission requirements in their respective regions through different mixes of resources 
but with common components of defense, diplomatic, and development staffs (the so-called 3-
D structure).  
This 3-D structure is represented in all cases but with varying emphasis on the D’s 
(Irvine, 2011: 49). A PRT is typically composed of military and civilian members with 
interagency and possibly multinational attachments. It will have a Headquarter (HQ) and Civil-
Military Affairs (CA)/Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) sections, a civilian-led 
reconstruction team, engineers, security and military observer teams, linguists and interpreters, 
and a medical team (Jacobsen, 2005; Brandstetter, 2005). PRTs have a broad mandate that 
covers the following areas: (1) They engage key government, military, tribal, village, and 
religious leaders in the provinces while monitoring and reporting on important political, 
military, and reconstruction developments; (2) they work with Afghan authorities to provide 
security, including support for key events such as the Constitutional Loya Jirga, presidential 
and parliamentary elections, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia 
forces; (3) they assist in the deployment and mentoring of Afghan national army and police 
units assigned to the provinces; (4) PRTs work closely together with the Afghan Government, 
the UN, other donors, and NGOs to provide needed development and humanitarian assistance. 
In view of the structure of leadership, one can divide PRT into two categories: light 
PRT, with a hierarchical military leadership (the US, United Kingdom and New Zealand 
variants) and heavy PRT, with a double civil-military leadership (the German model). With the 
full spectrum of headquarter functions and the capability to maintain situational awareness over 
an extended time period, a heavy PRT guarantees a systematic and integral approach in 
identifying development requirements, decision making, and planning, as well as evaluating International Security, Development, and Human Rights: Policy Conversion or Conflict? 
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progress. In contrast, a light PRT addresses security issues with a light footprint approach and 
is forced to concentrate these efforts and development tasks i a few persons, dealing with 
numerous roles and functions simultaneously (Brandstetter, 2005: 13; Ishizuka, 2007).  
 
The US PRTs 
 
The US drafted the idea of PRTs, but the American way of formulating and 
implementing this concept differs greatly from other nations’ PRTs. For the US, PRTs have 
been convenient political instruments to contribute to their respective exit strategies by getting 
its allies into the country and pull its forces out (Irvine, 2011: 27). The US approach is based on 
the traditional strategies of counter-insurgency and winning hearts and minds, which the US 
military has adopted for almost one decade in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Civil actors in the PRTs 
are subordinated under military leadership. They all pursue the goals formulated in OEF, 
namely, the uprooting of transnational terrorism (Al Qaeda and the Taliban) and the pursuit of 
sustainable stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan. 
At the institutional level, the entire PRT program is designed to benefit from an agreed 
upon concept of operations and an effective central coordinating authority. Its model features a 
complement of approximately 50 to 100 members (most of them from the military and three 
civilian government representatives from the State Department, the Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and from the Department of Agriculture (USDA)). There is also 
usually an Afghan representative from the Ministry of the Interior on the PRT. To be sure, the 
US PRTs profit from interagency delimitation of civilian and military roles and improved 
civilian agency staffing, funding, and administrative support (Perito, 2005). They focus on 
issues of governance, force protection, and quick impact development projects. Of great 
importance in each PRT is the Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC), which coordinates the 
work of PRTs with humanitarian organizations. Civil Affairs Teams and civil experts are 
responsible for the deliverance of services in less secure or underserved areas of Afghanistan. 
For example, USAID’s field program officers monitor all US reconstruction and development 
efforts. They work to build relationships with local leaders, identify local needs, and report on 
significant developments.  
While most US PRTs have retained the original PRT model (that emphasizes 
hierarchical military leadership), efforts have also been made to adopt the German model of the 
PRT: a double civil-military leadership (Schmunk, 2008: 117). The PRT for Panjshir-Tal has 
been led by both the US military and a representative from the State Department, Tom Kelsey. 
As Kelsey noted, a visit made by the US and Afghan leaders in June 2009 highlighted the 
success Panjshir has achieved with the assistance of the PRT in security, governance, and 
development, which “has become a model for the rest of Afghanistan.”
21   
In particular, the US PRTs in Regional-Command-East have demonstrated how the 
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements (from training, fielding, and 
funding, to partnership with maneuver units in the field) can be brought together to create the 
desired stabilizing effects in a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) effort (McCaffrey, 2009). They 
have been required to adjust their mindset to think about kinetic and non-kinetic operations, 
serving both as a security and development agency at the same time.
22 For example, as officers 
and soldiers carry out a mission to reopen a school in Afghanistan, it fits rightly into the 
Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN): protect the people, provide them with security and 
government services, and they will turn away from insurgency (Klein, 2010a).
23 The question 
at stake is no longer how the enemy can be engaged, but how the local district governor can be 
engaged. This counterinsurgency doctrine has already found positive resonance among Afghan 
and Pakistani leaders. Journal of International and Global Studies 
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Meanwhile, the effects of the rules of engagement remain limited, as soldiers involved 
in PRTs often find themselves trapped by the dilemma of self-protection and prohibition to 
harm a civilian. Frustrations and uncertainties emerge when PRT efforts appear to be in vain 
and when “winning over” the local people does not produce concrete results.
24 In particular, 
critics find that reconstruction projects have suffered from a lack of coordination and oversight. 
Military involvement in development brought criticism from relief agencies that claimed such 
tactics put development experts at risk by blurring the distinction between combatants and 
humanitarian workers (VENRO, 2009). Worse, in view of the surge of international and local 
PSCs, the local population in urban and rural areas alike had difficulties in clearly 
differentiating between PSCs and the existing international military establishment (including 
the PRTs), which appeared to further reduce the likelihood of PRTs’ success in winning the 
hearts and minds of the Afghan people (Swisspeace, 2007: 28). Even though US PRTs have 
striven to refine their medial cultural program in the south and east, where Pashtuns are the 
majority ethnic group, the work of PRTs remains largely limited, as the PRT might have 
become a means of serving the provider rather than the customer.
25 Finally, continuing 
differences and divisions between civilian representatives and military commanders regarding 
COIN have had negative consequences including poor coordination and deteriorating relations 
with the Afghan central government (WP, 2010; DeYoung, 2010).  
 
The German PRTs 
 
Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan can be attributed to its commitment to the 
NATO alliance against the backdrop of the global anti-terror war rather than to important 
strategic interests (Runge, 2008). The German model is distinctive from the U.S. model in that 
it is much larger, has dual military and civilian leadership, a large force protection component, 
and a clear separation of the military, diplomatic, and development parts. 
There are currently two German PRTs in Afghanistan, which are stationed mainly in the 
northern provinces (Kunduz & Fayzabad). In October 2003, the Bundeswehr (German federal 
armed forces) took over a US PRT and since then has developed a third model of PRT (besides 
the US and the UK models), which emerged as the first PRT in the context of ISAF and under 
NATO’s command. In the largest German PRT, in Kunduz, there are approximately 500-600 
German soldiers with civil representatives from the Federal Foreign Ministry (AA) and the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI). Unlike US and UK PRTs, which are involved mainly 
with military engagement and are led by the military, the German PRTs are characterized by a 
double civil and military leadership, namely led by both the AA and the Federal Ministry of the 
Defense (BMVg). Besides this distinction, both the BMI and the Federal Ministry of 
Development Cooperation (BMZ) have participated in the implementation of the German PRT 
concept. At the institutional level, coordination and cooperation work among four ministries is 
deemed to be of great advantage for a more effective result, as their cooperation should 
constitute an integrative modus operandi, conceptual and operational (Bundesregierung,2008; 
Paul, 2008: 16). The responsibilities of each ministry are clearly defined. For example, whereas 
the AA is responsible for the coordination of the civil aspects of PRTs and the contact with 
local and international decision makers, the BMZ coordinates development projects and 
allocates project contracts (Hett, 2005). 
Though the German PRTs differ from the US and UK models, they don’t carry out 
development projects with a large scale but rather tackle those so-called Quick Impact Projects 
(QIPs), which are deemed to produce short term results and also protect armed forces. The 
CIMIC projects are generally financed by the AA, BMZ, and private actors. The QIPs have 
been mainly financed by the Provincial Development Funds (PDF). Still, in comparison with International Security, Development, and Human Rights: Policy Conversion or Conflict? 
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the German operations in the Balkans, its PRTs engagement remains proportionally insufficient 
in Afghanistan.  
The content of German PRT work consists of three aspects. First, PRT officers establish 
civil and military relationships with local actors, representatives of the UNAMA, and 
international and local NGOs. Second, PRTs are to support local reconstruction projects so that 
the armed forces can be well accepted and recognized by the local population and so that force 
protection can better be achieved. Third, PRTs are supposed to support the armed forces 
through the information about the area picture, local military and civil actors, as well as social, 
economic, medical and ethnic situations in the region involved.  
In particular, ISAF pursues a long term goal, in which the principle of “self-
responsibility” is the core and in which the capabilities of the ANA should be strengthened 
(Deutsche Bundestag, 2005, 2007). Therefore, the German PRTs have developed a local 
peacebuilding approach, working together with local authorities and population (Nachtwei, 
2008). They have for example, established a permanent Provincial Advisory Team (PAT) to 
widen the areas of engagement, where PRTs are not present (in the Provinces Takhar, Jawsan, 
Sar-e Pol and Samangan). Also, the consulting teams are supposed to fulfill this function, too. 
As of 2009, German PRTs have changed the focus of their involvement toward more training 
work with civilian elements in the fields of security, governance, reconstruction and institution 
building, so that the Afghan counterparts can profit from this strategic partnering cooperation 
and take charge in the provision of security and stability by their own in the near future. 
Consequently, the transfer of German PRTs’ tasks to local counterparts has run more smoothly 
than other PRTs models, where the restructuring process from military to civil elements has 
taken much more time and incurred greater costs.
26  
The German PRTs have so far received positive feedback among Afghan military and 
political leaders. Based on a study conducted by the BMVg, experts note that CIMICs have 
grown up with gathered experience. The German government also observed that international 
commitments including German efforts in Afghanistan have achieved significant results during 
the past decade. Still many things remain to be done.
27 The concept of CIMIC/PRT has become 
an important tool for the safeguarding of effective operations, particularly in such fluid security 
situations as in Afghanistan. However, PRTs’ work covering security, good governance, and 
development issues have challenged the perceptions, capacity, and behavior of involved 
soldiers and officers of the Bundeswehr, which have a traditionally rigid structure and 
organization. Not only do soldiers and officers have to adapt to the new complex situations in 
trying to cultivate their intercultural competence, they also have to refine their military capacity 
in the midst of the internal restructuring process of the Bundeswehr (Seiffert, 2012: 79-85). The 
Kunduz accident in September 2009 in particular has made the issue of juridical status and 
security of soldiers in international criminal law more visible, as there exists a strong degree of 
ambivalence about the rules of engagement in such contested areas as in Afghanistan.
28  
Furthermore, critics express their frustrations and disappointments in several points. 
First, financial, human/personnel, material resources remain insufficient. Field personnel daily 
confront an impossible mission—to build a state without the culture of a nation state (Paul, 
2008). Secondly, there are claims that these efforts are missing a coherent strategy, which is 
expected in the framework of successful state- and nation-building processes (Hett, 2005). 
Furthermore, the cooperation with local warlords, including the recruitment of former 
militiamen as PSCs for the protection of armed forces, has also been under attack. Finally, 
NGOs consider the incorporation of civil elements in the military operations to be 
inappropriate, as the proportion of the mixture between the civil and military elements have 
threatened the neutrality of NGOs and henceforth their acceptance in the population. 
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A comparison between the US and German PRTs is summarized in the table 3. 1.  
  Structure  Actors  Goals, Principles 
and Rules 
Fields of 
engagements 
and strategies 
US PRTs  Hierarchy; military 
leadership; 
subordination 
under the global 
anti-terrorism war 
Department of 
Defense (DOD); the 
State Department; 
USAID; the 
Department of 
Agriculture (USDA); 
private security 
contractors; Afghan 
political elites; 
international/US 
human rights and 
humanitarian 
organizations 
Global anti-terror 
war; force 
protection; the 
pursuit of 
sustainable 
stability and 
reconstruction in 
Afghanistan 
Winning hearts-
and-minds-
strategy; counter-
terrorism; 
counterinsurgenc
y (COIN); 
integrated sticks-
and-carrots 
approach 
German 
PRTs 
Inter-ministerial 
(interagency) 
structure; 
horizontal 
coordination 
networks  
Federal Ministry of 
Defense; Federal 
Ministry of Interiors; 
Federal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; 
Federal Ministry of 
Development and 
Cooperation; German 
Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ); 
German civil 
contractors; 
international/German 
human rights and 
humanitarian 
organizations  
To achieve 
sustainable 
security and 
stability; 
Assurance of 
democratization 
process; Afghan 
ownership in the 
nation-building 
process; 
Strengthening of 
the legitimacy of 
the Afghan central 
government in 
Kabul; Acceptance 
and recognition 
among the local 
population  
PDF; PAT 
Table 3.1: US and German PRTs in comparison  
 
 
PRTs as Policy Instrument to Address the Overlap Issue – An Instituionalist 
Governenace Network Reading 
 
The idea and formation of PRTs arose in the context of changing understandings of 
security (in both the widening and deepening sense) and a relativist tendency of national 
sovereignty, in the merging of development and security discourse and policy, in the bid for 
coherence in development and humanitarianism, and in the increasing politicization and 
instrumentalization of aid. These factors have changed the basis for action by international International Security, Development, and Human Rights: Policy Conversion or Conflict? 
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actors responding to global threats and have led to new modes of intervention (Sidell, 2008). 
From an institutionalist network governance perspective and based on the interplay shown in 
the figure 2.1, the following paragraphs present some first hints of the interplay of issues 
between security, development, and human rights through the PRT work. 
 
The overlap between security and development 
 
In pursuing security, good governance and development in the state- and nationbuilding 
in Afghanistan, PRTs now are considered as the most appropriate policy option in a mid-range 
intensity of violence where instability still precludes heavy NGO involvement but where 
violence is not so acute that combat operations predominate. Different institutional 
arrangements, a constellation of resources and modes of interactions have led to different types 
of coordination and cooperation work between security and development agencies, IOs and 
NGOs. At the institutional level, as observed by an interagency team, US PRT military 
commanders need to incorporate civilian representatives into PRT strategy development and 
decision making (Feickert, 2006: 10). Civilian agencies also are asked to assign personnel with 
appropriate training and experience to PRTs in order to better fill key US PRT positions. In this 
sense, both military and civilian actors have to well tailor their resource commitment in order 
to facilitate policy coherence for the pursuit of policy goals. At the interactional level, whereas 
German PRT experience has demonstrated a constructive relationship with some development 
NGOs,
29 there are some NGOs that, from the very beginning, choose to distance themselves 
from any cooperation work with governmental agencies. They still have been able to obtain 
funds from Europe and establish local tribal support to carry out of their projects even in the 
regions under the US command.
30 Furthermore, as OED does not subordinate under a UN 
mandate, its PRTs work often has been viewed as part of anti-terror operations rather than as 
reconstruction activities. The soldiers are assigned to do COIN, for which they are not trained. 
This has led to a mixture between anti-terror operation and reconstruction work (Hett, 2005: 10 
ff). For Afghan local communities, the question “who is doing what” has led to some kind of 
confusion and misunderstanding toward PRTs (their role and mandate) (Roberts, 2007).  
 
The overlap between development and human rights 
 
Though human rights and its promotion as a normative policy goal have not been 
officially incorporated in the PRT work, at the interactional level, some development projects 
with educational agenda to promote the rights of girls to education and the efforts of some 
human rights NGOs to promote gender issues within the PRTs can be viewed as creating some 
synergistic effects for the promotion of human rights (Roberts, 2007). For example, one lesson 
learned from a US PRT is that PRTs should always promote Afghan women’s attendance at all 
provincial and district level meetings where possible.
31 At the same time, the PRT work has 
often prompted unrealistic expectations among the local population. As the discrepancy 
between expected results and reality has led to frustration and loss of trust, this loss of trust in 
the local population has in turn hindered the humanitarian and development work. In particular, 
as the NGO sector booms and NGO communities have spent up to 60 percent of their available 
funds alone for their administration and personnel costs, the Afghan government has begun to 
address the issue of NGOs’ wasted funds and corruption in Afghanistan (Mayr, 2010; 
Goodhand / Sedra, 2006). 
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The overlap between security and human rights 
 
At the interactional level, PRTs have confronted a cluster of contentious issues that 
arise in combat and non-permissive environments to cloud not only the relationship between 
international civilian assistance providers and international military forces but also the 
relationship between international military forces, the Afghan government and local 
communities. For one thing, the contentious issues surrounding the relationship between the 
international civilian assistance and the military include: the preservation of the humanitarian 
space that NGOs and IOs require to operate, the role of PRTs in promoting a secure 
environment, the use of military personnel to provide assistance, and information sharing and 
coordination. For example, there exist fundamental differences in the way the civilian 
assistance communities and military leaders conceive of a secure environment.
32 Also, the US 
and some of its NATO allies are engaged in their PRTs’ work often to the point of merging 
security and assistance objectives, which has at times put their civilian counterparts in an 
inappropriate situation (Minear/Donini, 2006: 3). With regard to the relationship between the 
military and local communities, despite the strict counterinsurgency rules to minimize civilian 
deaths, the number of unintended collateral civilian deaths in the midst of counterinsurgency 
operation, as shown in NATO airstrike in September 2009, has highlighted the intrinsic tension 
between the maintenance of security and the protection of civilians in contested areas. In 
particular, as the US attempted to boost the number of alternative security forces, Human 
Rights Watch has documented alarming levels of abuse by the Afghan Local Police, a force 
created by the US in remote areas.
33 
 
The overlap between security, development and human rights 
  
Has the practice of PRTs been able to ensure their proclaimed synergy effects in 
effectively addressing the interplay of security, development and human rights? Policy 
consensus and/or conflict can be recorded to be functional in the form of heavy PRTs (the 
German model), which means a relatively healthy degree of transparency, coordination work, 
policy evaluation, and trust at the institutional and interaction levels can be observed. In 
comparison, US PRTs in the form of light PRTs often fall short of adequate resources 
commitment and considering local needs (see the table 3.2). Still, the effects and success of a 
PRT remain highly contingent and depend on a variety of factors: the formulation of the 
strategic goal, mission requirement, demand of the host (local) government, and particularly 
the acceptance of the local population toward the stationed PRT. As long as PRTs are regarded 
as a part of the military, which has often prompted the recurrence of the collective memory of 
the past war experience and foreign invasion in Afghanistan, the credibility and success of 
PRTs will remain largely limited. In particular, NGOs have paid a considerably high price for 
such an alignment with the military in the framework of PRT work. Confronting an increasing 
number of aid workers (international and local) being victims of insurgencies, Donini considers 
this interplay of different issue networks to be a threat of the universality and neutrality of 
humanitarian action.
34 Hence, the functions of governance networks reflected in the work of 
PRTs can be considered as instrumental, where dominant security interests have striven to 
achieve their goals and the aligned civilian actors are often confronted with the challenges of 
the externality of their aid and development enterprise and the accompanied collateral damages 
and difficulties in carrying out their projects.  International Security, Development, and Human Rights: Policy Conversion or Conflict? 
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  Institutional level  Interaction level 
US PRTs (Light PRTs)  Consensus/Conversion 
  Too much: clear 
policy priorities and 
preferences (global 
anti-terror war; force 
protection)  
 
Consensus/Conversion 
  Functional: 
coordination and 
personnel 
arrangement problem 
between civilian and 
military actors  
 
  Conflict 
  Too little: civilian 
embeddedness in the 
military structure; 
organizational 
fluctuation due to 
short time 
engagement 
Conflict 
  Too little: Dependency 
on the breadth of 
capabilities of a small 
number of personnel; 
lack of consideration of 
the local mindset and 
needs 
 
German PRTs (Heavy 
PRTs) 
Consensus/Conversion 
  Functional: Inter-
agency structure 
fosters mutual trust  
Consensus/Conversion 
  Functional: 
facilitates cooperation 
and interfaces with 
civilian organizations 
(UN agencies and 
NGOs)  
 
  Conflict 
  Functional: Each 
ministry maintains its 
resources planning 
authority; conflict 
management; fruitful 
policy evaluation; 
however certain 
disadvantages in the 
command structure  
 
Conflict 
  Functional: has 
mobilizing and 
accelerating effects; 
contributes to infor-
mation provision (OI: 
operational 
information) 
 
 
Table 3.2: Consensus/Conversion and Conflict/Division at institutional and interaction levels 
within policy networks 
 
Conclusions 
 
Supported by an institutionalist network governance framework, this article addresses 
the intersection of security, development, and human rights through the analysis of 
CIMIC/PRT as a new policy approach in the complex nationbuilding in Afghanistan.  Journal of International and Global Studies 
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The analysis of the work of US and German PRTs shows that PRT model as an 
interagency and integrated policy approach has been able to fill the security-development gap 
(Uesugi, 2007) and prompted the redefinition of the norms and rules of each policy frame 
involved and called for more adaptability and widening capacity of each institution/agency 
involved to understand norms and rules of other policy counterparts. The PRTs have helped 
extend the authority of the Afghan government beyond Kabul. They have also facilitated 
reconstruction and dampened violence. At the same time, human rights issues have become 
elusive in the stability operation work of PRTs. Even while PRTs have helped pave the way 
from the transition toward the transformation period, where Afghan actors through 
strengthened capacity building can later take responsibility to guarantee the provision of 
security and development of their own country, PRTs fall short of addressing the underlying 
causes of insecurity in Afghanistan (the Taliban and Al Qaida, ethnic and regional rivalry, the 
infighting between warlords, increased lawlessness and banditry, and booming opium poppy 
cultivation and drug trade). In particular, due to the strong variation among different national 
models, the PRT model has had difficulties in measuring the effects of ongoing operations and 
determining whether the mission was on the right track. The methodology for assessment of 
progress was underdeveloped, and the participants had different appreciations of where the 
main challenges lay (Marklund, 2011). Thus, experts have suggested that the PRT should 
develop appropriate more mechanisms for the measurement of its progress and adopt a 
comprehensive strategy with an integrated sticks-and-carrots approach.
35 In particular, as some 
NGOs have successfully worked with local structures not only for the provision of security but 
also for the strengthening of the Afghan ownership in their development projects, the method 
of local embeddedness with the strong participation of local actors can surely provide 
innovative ideas for the modification of the PRT concept, which may efficiently address the 
drawbacks of the current PRT work (Schmeidl, 2006: 4).
36 
In view of the continuing weakness of the Afghan central government, whose political 
power has been mainly limited to the Kabul area and is still crippled by problems of corruption, 
many have become disillusioned about the feasibility of a Western model of presidential 
democracy in Afghanistan anchored in the 2001 Bonn Agreement (Baker, 2011). As noted by 
Biddle/Christia/Thier, the development of current politics unravels a tendency towards more 
decentralization—either in the form of a decentralized democracy (with federal states) or a less 
demanding model of mixed sovereignty—where local warlords would have more power even 
without democratic election and transparency. With this recognition in mind, for the US, 
NATO, the UN, international donors and NGOs, their major task is to work out an acceptable 
solution that would help put Afghanistan toward more security and sufficient stability in the 
near and long-term future (Biddle/Christia/Their, 2010). 
Finally, as the dominance of security interests in the integral policy approach of PRT 
has often intruded into and challenged the policy frames of development activities and human 
rights work, the introduction of the Human Security discourse, it seems, has yet fundamentally 
transformed the traditional security paradigm. The questions of policy consensus/conversion 
and conflict and how they have been addressed have still been mainly caught in the (neo)realist 
mindset. Therefore, a possible research agenda to deepen our understanding of the nexus 
between security, development, and human rights may be twofold: First, a systematic 
uncovering of the functions of diverse horizontal interactions (cooperation, coordination, 
conflict and resistance) reflected in the governance networks will be needed. Second, the 
phenomenon of how different understandings of security, development, and human rights in 
different socio-cultural contexts have interacted with what paradigm conflicts and with what 
effects on the policy networks involved deserves more clarification. International Security, Development, and Human Rights: Policy Conversion or Conflict? 
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1 An early version of this article was presented at the 10th International CISS Millennium Conference “Global 
Cooperation: Alliances, Institutions, and International Relations,” July 4-5, 2010, Venice, Italy. I thank Edward R. 
McMahon, Gavin Mount, and anonymous reviewers for helpful and constructive comments.  
2 As noted by Barnett, what once was a unilateral activity monopolized by powerful states has increasingly 
become a multilateral project (Barnett 2002).  
3 PCPB is defined as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in 
order to avoid relapse into conflict” (Butros-Ghali 1992).  
4 For them, security between states remains a necessary condition for people’s security. However, they notice that 
national security is insufficient to protect people’s security. Canada for example has identified peacebuilding, 
peacekeeping, disarmament, the protection of the rights of children and economic development through rule-based 
trade as key areas of the HS endeavor (the so-called Ottawa/Canada approach). See Bajpai 2000: 17-20. 
5 Insights into the concept of HS in relation to global governance, development, gender equality, specific regional 
experience of environmental insecurity, and problems of governance and institutions. See Thomas 2001; Najam 
2003; McKay 2004. 
6 Elaborated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and adopted by the 
member states of the UN at the 2005 World Summit, this concept can be viewed as an attempt to make state 
boundaries more permeable (Broughton 2007: 3). Details about the controversies surrounding humanitarian 
intervention and regional responses see Macfarlane et al. 2004.  
7 The ideas of the R2P contain the more general principles of “sovereignty as responsibility,” the responsibility to 
prevent conflict, to react, and to rebuild peace. The doctrine has particularly listed the more specific threshold 
criteria and operational and cautionary principles—right authority and due process—to ensure the ethical 
legitimacy of intervention. See ICISS 2001; Thakur 2002. 
8 The article is mainly based on desk research with sources from official documents, academic and agency papers, 
added by two expert interviews conducted respectively in September 2010 and March 2012.  
9 USAID finds for example that the deprivation of land rights constitutes one of root causes of food insecurity in 
the Greater Horn of Africa. See USAID 1994. Breaking the Cycle of Despair: President Clinton’s Initiative on the 
Horn of Africa. Building A Foundation for Food Security and Crisis Prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa: A 
Concept Paper for Discussion. Nov. <http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/ghai/cycle/causes.html>. Similarly, 
Womankind Worldwide, a UK-based development charity, argues that gender inequality is a root cause of poverty 
and insecurity in many developing countries. See Womankind Worldwide 2005. Submission to the International 
Development Committee Session on Development and Conflict. <www.womankind.org.uk>.  
10 Thus, a combination of concepts and tools from different disciplines can be deployed to put some order into the 
chaos, including policy narratives, policy communities, discourse analysis, regime theory, change management, 
and the role of street-level bureaucrats in implementation (Sutton 1999). 
11 Issue networks can be considered as arenas in complex policy processes. They are also occasionally an 
advocacy coalition where a set of actors negotiating with one another about the way to solve a specific problem or 
realize (or block) a particular project (Koppenjan 2007: 144-45). 
12 The action of “safeguard” means that HS is deliberately protective. One should develop strategies providing 
HS, identify the threats and then seek to prevent threats from materializing, mitigate harmful effects for those that 
eventuate, and help victims cope. In this sense, the vital cores of HS pertain to survival, to livelihood, and to basic 
dignity (Alkire 2003). 
13 At the same time, there exist some fundamental drawbacks in the ESS. It obviously omits that development is 
also a precondition for security. In some ways, the ESS is simply an exposition of European threat assessment and 
underlying principles to guide subsequent actions, rather than a genuine strategy – with agreed targets and 
objectives and detailed action plans for their achievement (Pullinger 2007). 
14 Against this background, some important concepts and approaches have been presented. For example, the “Do 
Not Harm” approach that strives to minimize the negative impact of humanitarian and development assistance 
under conditions of conflict; the concept of human security; the “global system reform” movement that infuses 
concerns with development and conflict nexus in all North-South relations of trade, investment, and consumption 
(Uvin 2002). 
15 As Kline points out, R2P raises serious challenges for relief agencies and humanitarian organizations concerned 
that their humanitarian work will become even more associated with military actions (Kline 2006). 
16 In a more concrete manner, the concept of HRBA to development (including the fight against poverty) is 
contained in five legal principles, namely: 1) application of the international human rights framework; 2) 
empowerment of rights holders; 3) participation in one's own development (as of right and not just as best  
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practice); 4) non-discrimination and prioritization of vulnerable groups; as well as 5) accountability of duty-
bearers to rights-holders (for process and impact). See IHRN 2008.  
17 Information obtained through a background information interview with two officers of the Federal Ministry of 
the Defense (BMVg) on March 6, 2012. 
18 NATO Brief 2003. „Interview. Lieutenant-General Götz Gliemeroth: kommandierender General ISAF, “Issue 4. 
< http://152.152.96.1/docu/review/2003/issue4/german/interview.html>.  
19 As planned, some 352,000 (ANA) will be ready to defend the country the day most US army leaves. Still, troop 
quality is poor due to the large quotas to fill and time pressure for training. Moreover, ANA has troubles with the 
problems of Taliban infiltration, drug use and desertion (Baker 2011: 28). 
20 As of March 2010, there were 112,092 Department of Defense (DOD) contractors in Afghanistan, compared to 
approximately 79,100 uniformed personnel. In other words, contractors made up 59% of DOD’s workforce in 
Afghanistan. The DOD established an office to oversee them. See Schwartz 2010 and Anne Flaherty 2009. “In 
Afghanistan, US military's ‘Help Wanted’ sign,” Associated Press (AP), March 23. 
21 Statement made by the US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry. See “ISAF: NATO forces in Afghanistan: US and 
Afghan Leaders visit PRT Panjshir,” by Air Force Capt. Stacie N. Shafran and Army Sgt. Sean Finch Provincial 
Reconstruction Team Panjshir Public Affairs Office, June 15, 2009, 
<http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=89929864839> 
22 Soldiers are trained to act in a kinetic environment (that is Army code for a place where the likelihood of attack 
is great and that the military force will be called upon to employ weapons and tactics to defeat an armed enemy). 
Non-kinetic operations are those tasks that soldiers are asked to do that involve anything other than combat related 
tasks. The distribution of humanitarian aid, mentoring local officials to plan and build local infrastructure and 
governance capacity, and assisting in facilitating development work are all non-kinetic tasks for military forces 
working in a PRT setting. See Irvine 2011: 54. 
23 The COIN doctrine introduced by the former ISAF commander Stanley McChrystal has considerably changed 
the earlier counter-terrorism strategy of training soldiers as storm troopers to find, fix and finish the enemy. 
24 “They (the people) are sitting on the fence, waiting to see which side is stronger.” (Lieutenant Reed Peeples, 
Dog Company, cited in Klein 2010a: 20). 
25 “You cannot reach the Pashtun people with such programs presented (Monday ‘Mother Teresa’ and Tuesday 
‘Rambo’!” Information gained via an email correspondence with the president of a German NGO “German Aid 
for Afghan Children” Dr. med. Reinhard Eroes, on Sept. 6, 2010. See also Jalali 2007: 37. 
26 Information obtained through a background information interview with two officers of the Federal Ministry of 
the Defense (BMVg) on March 6, 2012. 
27 Cited in VENRO 2009. See also Bundesregierung 2010 and 2011. 
28 A deadly coalition airstrike near the city of Kunduz in northern Afghanistan has killed civilians (with an overall 
death toll estimated as high as 70). According to NATO, the airstrike targeted militants who had stolen two fuel 
tankers the day before. It said that most of those killed were Taliban. On the other side, Afghan authorities said 
that civilians who had flocked to collect free fuel at the behest of insurgents died among them. Despite the vague 
details, it was supposed to be the deadliest attacks on civilians, since the introduction of strict counterinsurgency 
rules to minimize civilian deaths. The attack has prompted deep military consequences as well as political 
ramifications in Germany. Oberst Klein who commanded the airstrike resigned and has been accused of violating 
norms of international criminal law. The Federal Court later has decided not to pursue further judicial procedures 
against Oberst Klein, issued on April 16, 2010. See Generalanstalt des Bundesgerichtshof 2010; Pietsch 2012: 
116-117. 
29 Information obtained through a background information interview with two officers of the Federal Ministry of 
the Defense (BMVg) on March 6, 2012. 
30 In times of unrest and protests, where anti-Americanism resentments re-emerge (for example, following the 
accidental burning Korans in February 2012), these NGOs prove to be in a safer situation than their counterparts 
and IOs who work with governmental agencies. See newsletter from a German NGO “Kinderhilfe-Afghanistan”, 
issued on Feb. 25, 2012.  
31 Lesson Learned by US PRT, as reported by US DoS, Afghanistan Desk, August 2007. 
32 The military emphasizes national security, public order, stability and force protection – all of which are 
enhanced by assertively addressing and reducing the sources of threat. On the other hand, civilian assistance 
providers equate security with ensuring that the belligerents do not perceive them as a threat (Dziedzic/Seidl 
2005). 
33 These militias have been accused of rape, murder, extortion, armed land grabs and human rights violations. 
Cited in Baker 2011: 32.  International Security, Development, and Human Rights: Policy Conversion or Conflict? 
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34 “… the externality of the aid enterprise and the baggage that comes with it - values, lifestyle, attitude, and 
behavior of aid workers - challenge the purported universality of humanitarian action. The coherence agenda, 
exemplified both by the integration of humanitarian and human rights concerns within the UNAMA and by the 
pressures on NGOs to be part of the Coalition’s ‘combat team,’ colors the operating environment of the aid 
community. And the heavy toll inflicted by insurgents and criminal elements on the security of aid workers, both 
Afghan and international, cuts across the three other themes and deeply affects staff morale and the ability to 
address critical humanitarian need” (Donini 2006: 2-3). 
35 These mechanisms may include well managed relationship with relevant actors, an agreement between these 
actors on the operational objectives, a systematic and structured approach to the assessment of all lines of 
operations, a reinforced link between planning and assessment, and adapted staff skills (Marklund 2011). A 
comprehensive strategy should couple the deployment of more PRTs by NATO with determined action against 
those causes of insecurity (Jacobsen 2005; Biddle 2010; Kissinger 2010). 
36 The development and educational work of a German NGO „ German Aid for Afghan Children” in the east of 
Afghanistan proves to be successful, as it has gained full support from the local population, where for example 
two girl schools have been established even during the Taliban regime. Information acquired through a speech 
given by Reinhard Eroes, president of this NGO, Sept. 2, 2010, Akademie Franz-Hitze-Haus, Muenster, Germany. 
Details see www.aid-for-afghan-children.com  Journal of International and Global Studies 
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